Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform
Ciarán O’Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I present a vision of the corporation as a moral person. I point to “the separation of ownership and control”1 as a moment
when the corporation broke away from the moral lives of ownermanagers. I then draw out the manner in which we can speak of the
company as a moral person. Finally, through a discussion of social reporting in two British banks, I point to a shift in how this moral personhood is articulated, with the rise of corporate governance—or doing
business well—as its own foundation of corporate responsibility. I propose a view of corporate responsibility as a “transmission mechanism”
for the company’s role in moral life, situated in the broader social conception of “moral economy.”2 This viewpoint sets out landscapes of legitimation and justification through which the ties that underpin economic life are founded.
II. THE MORAL ECONOMIES OF CAPITALISM
The company—as it was first encountered during the Industrial
Revolution—was often regarded as destabilizing and subverting established social norms. Politicians expressed concern about disruption of the
family and the domestic sphere caused by industrialization, and so they
sought reforms aimed at restoring the domestic sphere as a moral center
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1. The separation of ownership and control refers to the emergence of a managerial class associated with, but not identical to, an unconcentrated shareholding population. ADOLF BERLE &
GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ch. 1 (1932).
2. Moral economy refers to discourses regarding the relationship between prevailing norms of
fairness and the broad facts of economic distribution. E. P. THOMPSON, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF
THE ENGLISH CROWD IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, PAST & PRESENT 76 (1971); see, e.g., JAMES
SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT (1976).
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in people’s lives.3 In fictional accounts from the period, redemption for
owner-managers was held to be available through encounters with domestic life.4
The moral transformation of Mr. Thornton in Elizabeth Gaskell’s
North and South sets out an instructive picture of the link between industrial capitalism and the capitalist in this era. Gaskell’s portrayal of “powerful and invisible social processes in visible forms”5 is instructive for
this paper’s purpose. Her narrative serves as an account of the wavering
line between public and private in industrial capitalism. It also gives the
reader a good reference point with which to set out the distinct character
of the company cast free of the capitalist.
Gaskell, who “writes in a city in which industrial production and a
dominant market are the determining features, and in which . . . there is
the new hard language of class against class,”6 sets North and South in
the town of Milton, based on her native Manchester. Milton is experienced through the eyes of Margaret Hale, who witnesses the town as riven with class conflict, especially as expressed in struggles between Mr.
Thornton, a mill owner and manager, and Mr. Higgins, a worker.
In the early stages of the novel, Mr. Thornton is portrayed as viewing his responsibilities toward his workers as purely formal and procedural. He regards himself as a “benign despot,” ruling over his “hands”
in the mill and having no regard for them beyond the factory gates.7
North and South turns in large part on the shifts in Mr. Thornton’s feelings, not toward the workforce so much as toward his own sense of how
production, management, and responsibilities all interrelate.
Mr. Thornton finds redemption in his encounters with domesticity
through the family lives of the Hales and of Mr. Higgins. Over the course
of the novel, Mr. Thornton is redeemed by his encounters with the domestic sphere. He is brought to a point where he devotes attention to the
welfare of workers, sees them as human beings rather than as hands, and
expresses a wish to engage them in cooperative “discourse . . . beyond
the cash nexus,”8 including sharing meals and plans with them. “The pri3. See Timothy L. Alborn, The Moral of the Failed Bank, 38 VICTORIAN STUD. 199 (1995).
4. See CATHERINE GALLAGHER, THE INDUSTRIAL REFORMATION OF ENGLISH FICTION (1988).
5. Andrew H. Miller, Subjectivity Ltd: The Discourse of Liability in the Joint Stock Companies
Act of 1856 and Gaskell’s Cranford, 61 ENG. LITERARY HIST. 139, 141 (1994) (commenting on
Dickens).
6. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 219 (1973).
7. ELIZABETH GASKELL, NORTH AND SOUTH 118 (1855). Gaskell’s plot turns on similar
themes to those found in CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Longman 2003) (1854).
8. GASKELL, supra note 7, at 420. For a discussion of the idea of the “cash nexus,” see
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 79.
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vate solution in North and South,” Catherine Gallagher writes, “does not
entail a retreat from social responsibility; rather, it is a solution that
clears away practical barriers to social harmony.”9 In other words, class
conflict is resolved in the novel because contractual relations transform
into friendships.
In the narrative, redemption comes through attention to the perspectives of others and to a new sense of responsibility that dissolves Mr.
Thornton’s sense of a divide between his private and public selves. His
renewed responsibility emerges from the domestic, private sphere, which
acts as a “school of social reform.”10 Thus, capitalism was redeemed
through reform of the owner-manager himself. The “cash-nexus” of production was not imagined as necessarily remote and separate from the
notional private realm. Though not fully integrated with it, it was dependent upon it: the moral life of capitalism was the moral life of the
capitalist.
The subsequent separation of ownership and control that emerges
with the switch from owner–manager capitalism to shareholder capitalism connoted the company as “hollowed out” with regard to its relationship to individual moral agency. Companies, as they emerge with shareholder capitalism, are “often seen as rather malleable, as empty or half
empty vessels into which different contents can be poured; entities whose
direction and behaviour are determined, as it were, from the outside—
from who controls them—rather than from within.”11 As Paddy Ireland
points out, the managerial theories of the mid-twentieth century and
more recent stakeholder models are inspired by this “hollowing out” to
advocate corporate governance models that license orientations beyond
the shareholder.12
Beyond that, the mainstream finance-based Anglo-American model
of corporate governance,13 which views the company as a series of multilevel markets for contract generation and contract management, holds to
a similar hollowing out thesis. But in this model, the company is less an
articulation of the board’s will and more a series of signals to markets.
9. GALLAGHER, supra note 4, at 177.
10. Id. at 115.
11. Paddy Ireland, Capitalism Without the Capitalist, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 69 (1996).
12. Id.
13. See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2009); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization,
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32 (2010).
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The standard thesis is similar to the managerial and stakeholder positions
Ireland outlines in that it assumes corporate personality to have dissipated with the separation of ownership and control. For Ireland himself, the
company is a “personification of industrial capital” and is subject to the
“relentless logic”14 of capitalism in its behavior and form. What is missing in all these hollowing out perspectives is the kind of definite moral
anchor for corporate conduct that was held to exist when corporate and
individual conduct were more closely aligned. As I argue in the following sections, the corporation, floating free of individual moral personhood, creates a kind of moral personhood through narratives that seek to
define and stabilize the firm’s conduct and character.15
These narratives of moral personhood draw on the conventions of
moral economy16—struggles and conventions through which questions of
distribution, desert, and economic order in society are debated and resolved—so as to lend internal coherence to the productive and disciplinary practices of the firm and to provide external context for corporate
action. Furthermore, prevailing ideas of how the company and its purpose ought to be characterized act as transmission mechanisms that explain and mediate the company and wider market imperatives at work in
society.
In analyzing the corporation’s character narrative, a critical consideration is the concept of social responsibility and its role in articulating a
public face for the corporation. I point to the manner in which responsibility narratives are aligned with wider norms and imperatives in the
structure of the firm and as conceived through the ideological precepts of
market-driven social reform.
The question of personhood is most useful in interrogating issues of
corporate responsibility. It helps in understanding the company as a unified agent characterized by the production of moral narratives. But that is
not to say that I see the company as intrinsically a person. The company
is, rather, a fictional person, whose sense of intentionality and agency is
generated from the narratives attached to it. Those narratives are themselves not intrinsic but are the product of negotiation and conflict over
ambiguous resources, laws, and rules attached to economic production
14. Ireland, supra note 11, at 69.
15. See Ciarán O’Kelly & Melvin Dubnick, Power and the Ethics of Reform, in ETHICS IN
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (H. George Frederickson & Richard K. Ghere eds., 2d ed. 2013) (discussing
organizational ethics and the struggle to define the organizational purpose, albeit regarding the public sector).
16. For information on the concept of moral economy, see SCOTT, supra note 2; THOMPSON,
supra note 2; William James Booth, On the Idea of the Moral Economy, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653
(1994).
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and the myths and conventions of social life to which those negotiations
and conflicts refer.17 Personhood here is performative.
Through this lens, corporate responsibility is more than a strategic
focus on corporate executives’ “reputation, competitiveness[,] and riskmanagement.”18 Instead, we should view corporate responsibility as an
attempt to focus and define the company, to situate and personify itself
as a set of “practices and institutions that surround the moral life,”19 and
to explain itself in terms of ordinary moral life. The business case for
moral responsibility, though important, is only half the picture.20 Corporate responsibility is a struggle to articulate a kind of moral standing inwardly toward the corporation as well as outwardly toward society at
large. While I argue for a thicker sense of corporate responsibility
through a discussion of personhood, I do not claim that that responsibility is necessarily radical or transformative.21 My claim, rather, is that
corporate responsibility reflects an incessant desire to embed the company in ordinary moral life.
In the next part of the Article, I give an account of the company as a
unified moral agent. Following the work of List and Pettit,22 I focus on
the company’s emergence through struggles to negotiate and define its
practices and institutions through broader social myths and conventions.
I discuss narratives and personhood, both in natural persons and in the
company. I show how the shortcomings of the narrative self in natural
persons actually make the concept more telling for companies. I point to
17. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340
(1977); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479 (1997) [hereinafter Edelman & Suchman, Legal Environments]; Mark
C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996)
[hereinafter Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths].
18. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: DEVELOPING
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE UK (2001) (U.K.); see Simon Deakin, Squaring the
Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the U.K., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
976, 985 (2002).
19. Terry Pinkard, Virtues, Morality and Sittlichkeit, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 217, 226 (1999) (calling
the emergence of such practices and institutions a “Sittlichkeit,” that is, the set of “practices and
institutions that surround the moral life”).
20. See David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 523 (2011); see also David J. Vogel, Is There a Market for Virtue?, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 19
(2005).
21. See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371
(2008); Ronen Shamir, The De-Radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 CRITICAL SOC.
669 (2004); see also Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, CSR and Changing Modes of Governance,
in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE
DEVELOPMENT? 77 (Peter Utting & José Carlos Marques eds., 2009) [hereinafter CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY].
22. CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY (2011).
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the manner in which the dynamics of corporate moral personhood act at
the level of the economy as transmission mechanisms between society
and market. In the part after that, I draw out some of the character of
corporate responsibility through an analysis of corporate reports, focusing especially on HSBC and Barclays Bank in the U.K. I point to the
shift in the company’s moral narratives toward a conception of responsibility as doing business well.
III. THE COMPANY AS A UNIFIED MORAL AGENT
When it came to the kind of capitalist organization described by
Gaskell, the moral character of the organization arose from its association with the capitalist. There was little sense of a distinctive corporate
personhood in the terms I set out above because the company as a distinct entity was not fully realized. As a consequence, the company was
also accessible to the moral predilections of capitalists. For instance, the
religious senses of some manufacturers famously prompted them to pursue a less brutal—if more patriarchal—factory capitalism than they
might otherwise have done. Taking one prominent example, urban spaces were constructed through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century
with a view toward workers’ welfare, broadly speaking.23 Social responsibility was, in these cases, not corporate, but personal. Owner–manager
power—even if it was conceived in highly patriarchal terms—was not
minimized through the imagined equality of contract, nor was it dismissed as beyond the capacities of capitalism.
The understanding of personalized capitalism upon which North
and South sits is at odds from the capitalism that emerges with the separation of ownership and control. The potential for a more extensive partiality fades in the face of the emergence of the company as a standalone
device. Whereas capitalism imagined in Victorian England was restored
to society through the owner-manager, the separation of ownership and
control sees the modern company cast adrift from capitalists.
After all, the separation of ownership and control implies the separation of individual moral sentiments from action in production. Managerial power is imagined as being put to the service of a passive shareholding body. This lends a twofold distance from moral reasoning over corporate actions when managers decline to follow their moral predilections.
23. For a discussion on Cadbury, see Charles Dellheim, The Creation of a Company Culture,
92 AM. HIST. REV. 13 (1987); Charles Wilson, Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain, 18
ECON. HIST. REV. 183 (1965); see also David J. Jeremy, The Enlightened Paternalist in Action, 33
BUS. HIST. 58 (1991); Michael Rowlinson & John Hassard, The Invention of Corporate Culture, 46
HUM. REL. 299 (1993).
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First, it creates distance from moral reasoning where those predilections
conflict with their duties to the company’s members. Second, shareholders cannot bring their moral reasoning to bear because they have very
little control over the everyday actions of the company beyond those reserved for them in the articles of association.24
One might ask what the separation of ownership and control means
for responsibility. Elizabeth Wolgost provides one possible answer: responsibility more or less disappears.25 I suggest a different tack, however. While it is true that the separation of ownership and control is also the
separation of corporate action from individual moral sentiments, this
does not necessarily mean that the company loses its moral content on
the whole. Rather, the company is personified through the development
of its own moral narrative.
My central claim is that narratives of responsibility are narratives of
personhood. Much energy is expended on situating the company in a
moral environment, providing a context through which it can be understood and explained, both internally and externally. Through this endeavor we see the emergence of the company as an unified and autonomous agent. Following List and Pettit, corporate personhood is performative: it suggests that “a person is an agent who can perform effectively in
the space of obligations.”26
So, I take personhood to relate to the performance of agency in a
sphere of mutual obligations. I also see this performance—intentionality
around the “presentation of a moral self”27—as defined and shaped by an
intense concern with the construction of a normative environment around
which the firm coheres. Performative personhood occurs, on this level, in
the eyes of others. Adam Smith states that
man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be
that thing which is the natural and proper object of love [and] he
naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that
thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred.28

24. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34
(U.K.). The balance of power over action was established in large part by the beginning of the twentieth century, from that point on, shareholder decision making was limited to questions over the trade
in shares rather than over the government of companies.
25. ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON (1992).
26. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 22, at 173. As such, I do not imbue the corporation with intrinsic
personhood. Nor do I view the issue of personhood as a thin metaphorical matter, little more than
useful shorthand for the purposes of contract management.
27. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1969).
28. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 132 (2002).
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If this is correct, then we should see the performance of moral selfhood—the situating of self in broad societal norms—as placing the company far beyond formal and procedural domains.
This is not to say that the performance of personhood is directly and
explicitly a function of the company or its directing minds, though they
are obviously powerful agents in any particular situation. The company’s
moral character does not exist as an institution fixed in its character, defined by law, and brought to markets ready-made. Rather, it emerges
from an uncertain and contingent interplay of laws, rules, and conventions, and from the negotiation of and struggles over how those laws,
rules, and conventions can be defined and applied.
This interplay is necessarily underpinned by a series of myths and
“widespread understandings of social reality.”29 Such myths emerge from
and are acted upon by a myriad of social forces—not least, those arising
from organizational persons negotiating and internalizing their own regulatory landscapes.30 As Suchman and Edelman have said about law in
general, it is
actually a welter of conflicting principles, imperfect analogies, and
ambiguous generalities. Thus, lawyers, judges, enforcers, and target
populations negotiate the meaning of law in each application, seeking workable consensus rather than logical certainty.31

Similar things might be said about the constitutional, contractual,
and cultural forms that emerge through and are brought to bear upon the
corporation. The law’s regulatory landscapes, in the broadest sense, do
not act upon social and corporate realities. They are constitutive of social
and corporate realities. These landscapes do not act upon ready-made
markets: they constitute the many markets—for products, for shares, for
talent—through which the company is defined. A performative personhood emerges through these ambiguities, not least as an attempt to solidify and define a coherent corporate environment with the goal of directing
and controlling the workforce and other aspects of production.
Thus, narratives surrounding the corporate form both evolve in accordance with wider myths and norms pertaining to capital and production—with questions of moral economy—and articulate the emergence
of the corporate person through the shifting power structures of corporate
governance. Of course, the character of the corporate person and its pres29. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17, at 347.
30. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the ‘Haves’ Hold Court, 33 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 941 (1999).
31. Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths, supra note 17, at 932.
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ence in society is itself unstable because it tracks the shifting balances of
power within corporations, and between corporations and other institutions and realms in social and economic life.32 It is within this context
that we should see the company’s moral personhood emerge.
Performative personhood is focused on the construction of moral
narratives that provide a context for production. These narratives in turn
rely on wider moral economy—struggles over the questions of distribution, desert, and hierarchy. The company—cast free of the capitalist—
continues to seek out a moral character. The corporate narrative of selfhood emerges from an attempt to situate the company in broader practices and institutions. More than that, however, the corporation actively
constructs practices and institutions through its metrics-generation capacities, hierarchical structures, and social power. Without minimizing its
own keying into existing conventions, the company, far more than any
natural person, shapes the landscape within which it acts.
IV. NARRATIVES AND PERSONHOOD
The idea of narrative selfhood has been invoked as a mode of understanding human moral life. Charles Taylor said the following with
respect to the development of a sense of the good:
[It] has to be woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story. But this is to state another basic condition of making
sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative. . . . It has
often been remarked that making sense of one’s life as a story is also, like orientation to the good, not an optional extra; that our lives
exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent narrative
can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have
a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.33

Our moral lives, in other words, represent an important part of our constituting ourselves through the production of stories about our lives as a
whole.
That said, in her discussion of narratives of selfhood (both factual
and normative), Samantha Vice disputes the claim that “having a different self-conception from one that is narrative in form (assuming this is
possible) is mistaken in a very significant way.”34 She suggests that the
“chancy and incomplete”35 character of human life is not well encom32. For a longer discussion, see Ciarán O’Kelly & Sally Wheeler, Internalities and the Foundations of Corporate Governance, 21 SOC. & LEG. S. 469 (2012).
33. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 47 (1989).
34. Samantha Vice, Literature and the Narrative Self, 78 PHILOSOPHY 93, 94 (2003).
35. Id. at 107.

982

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:973

passed by the narrative form. In other words, while we are tempted to
present ourselves in a story form, our lives as lived are more nuanced,
more complicated, and quite often, more mundane than narratives allow.
While we may turn to the narrative form in our autobiographical moments, for the most part, “we just live.”36
What Vice points out as a weakness in the “narrative self” metaphor—that its tidiness and artificiality do not map onto human life as it is
in fact lived—is actually what makes the metaphor work when it is applied to the personhood of the firm. The inner life of the firm seems a
perfect locus for the emergence of a narrative self. Contrary to standpoints in the finance-oriented and stakeholder traditions mentioned by
Ireland—whereby the firm is hollowed out due to the separation of ownership and control—the company as it re-emerged is embodied by the
production of narratives presenting itself to a multiplicity of observers.
Floating free of the moral lives of capitalists has not left the company
hollowed out. Rather, the company seeks to define and set out its moral
landscape through the production of narratives of selfhood.
Narrative is crucial for thinking about the performative personhood
of the company because, at base, the company acts as a narrativegenerating institution. The “practices and institutions” of moral life are
defined and generated with reference to the “myths” and conventions of
social life,37 but the company and its governance are distinctive in that
the company explains itself as embedded in moral life.
The company’s public face and its internal system of justifications
are explanation all the way down, or more succinctly, they are a narrative. The company generates its own practices and institutions largely
within the company but also beyond the company’s bounds. Governance
processes and procedures within the company, and the dynamics of admonition and approbation that are driven by them, all rely on the company manufacturing a normative environment through which action can be
explained and from there structured and controlled.
Discipline cannot simply act through force. As Foucault points out,
the normalization of discipline—rendering it invisible so that coercion
becomes collaboration—is the most effective way to structure social institutions and the individuals who work within them.38 Without the manufacturing of explanatory narratives or production of “justificatory
36. Id. at 108.
37. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17.
38. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 187 (1979); see also John Roberts & Robert
W. Scapens, Accounting as Discipline, in CRITICAL ACCOUNTS 107 (David J. Cooper & Trevor M.
Hopper eds., 1990).
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truths,”39 discipline simply becomes a site of conflict. However, by producing those narratives, internal work can be given purpose.
Governance processes are not disciplinary only in prohibitory
terms. They are also acted out as licenses, defining and allocating both
material and normative values throughout the organization. “An occupation,” according to E. C. Hughes, “consists, in part, of a successful claim
of some people to licence to carry out certain activities which others may
not, and to do so in exchange for money, goods or services.”40 And while
the company is shaped in large part by the human society it draws on,41 it
refines and enhances social norms toward corporate ends and then promotes and demotes in line with those norms. Corporate capitalism, in this
sense, chooses its own virtues.
Similarly, beyond the company, the company and corporate governance are set out through corporate reports, a social-responsibility
presence, and various signals to markets, policy makers, and other publics. Again, these external features are meaningless without some kind of
normative content. The ambiguous, negotiated character of the company42 must be established in a manner that allows the company to cohere
internally and to conduct itself (and control its environment) externally.
This is the core of performative personhood.
This is not simply about the exercise of corporate power. The construction of a moral environment—through an interaction with forces
within and without the firm—involves an effort to explain and negotiate
the embeddedness of the company in the ordinary moral world, and simultaneously, to ground the various ways in which work within the company and corporate action can be set apart from “ordinary” moral life.
The corporate environment on these terms is socially and institutionally
educative.
V. THE COMPANY AS A TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
So, when we think of the company as “personifying capital,” we
should think of it as manufacturing and disseminating narratives that set
out its place in the social environment and that justify its internal structures and wider social role. This brings us to one crucial issue arising
39. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 383 (1980) (speaking of
“justificatory truths” as “the moral philosopher’s special form of bad faith,” whereby people present
moral vocabularies as facts and seek to enforce standpoints as a result; for instance, the presentation
of the company as a nexus of contracts is arguably just such a maneuver).
40. EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK 78 (1958).
41. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (rev. ed. 1993).
42. See Suchman & Edelman, Rational Myths, supra note 17; see also Edelman & Suchman,
Legal Environments, supra note 17.
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from the narration of the company’s moral life: broad ideas of the company shape conceptions of political economy. Prevailing ideas of the
company act as transmission mechanisms, providing a moral context and
grounding to the market economy.
Much has been written about the liberal and neoliberal claims on
“self-ordering”43 markets as free-standing “sites of truth”44 where questions of justice have no place. For Polanyi, the utopian project to
disembed market from society, although doomed for failure, presents a
mortal risk to society as a whole45 as the spontaneous ordering mechanisms of markets are extended ever further into social life. The disruptive
force of markets sees alternative social structures set aside if they cannot
be reconfigured as subject to the account-making and value requirements
of market orders.46 By this measure, markets are a standard of legibility
against which society must be held.47
For most people, the corporation mediates more or less all interaction with market forces today. Our economic life, in other words, is a
corporate life. It may be that this is experienced as the invocation and
enforcement of supposedly iron market laws, shorn of moral content.
This might not be the norm, however. Take the issue of employment and
corporate downsizing: layoffs are often presented as inescapable products of market forces. This is articulated in more nuanced ways than
would be suggested by the idea that the corporation treats market forces
as a simple fait accompli.
Take for instance an admiring account of Jack Welch’s downsizing
scheme that reduced General Electric’s workforce by close to 100,000
people during the 1980s:
Jack Welch countered that nothing—including one’s job—could be
considered sacred, and he had a forceful argument for this reasoning. Ultimately, all that mattered was the survival of the company.
That was what counted most, not any particular job. He knew that
his downsizing program would cause pain, a great deal of pain, yet
it could not be helped. Not if General Electric was to survive and
43. 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 68–71 (1973).
44. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS 31 (2008); see Ute Tellmann, Foucault
and the Invisible Economy, 6 FOUCAULT STUD. 5 (2009) (providing an interesting account on the
“invisible hand”).
45. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
46. On the disruption wreaked by markets, some scholars, even those scholars who agree with
Hayek, have been given pause. See J OHN GRAY , H AYEK ON LIBERTY (3d ed. 1998).
47. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998); see also James C. Scott, Some Replies
on Markets, Languages, and Law, CATO UNBOUND (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.catounbound.org/2010/09/27/james-c-scott/some-replies-on-markets-languages-and-law/.

2013]

Corporate Governance as a School of Social Reform

985

flourish in a more competitive global arena. Welch was prepared to
be stoic, though he admitted in later years that downsizing was the
worst part of his job.48

This passage indicates a common position on the market—the
“competitive global arena”—as a “site of truth.”49 Nothing, it seems, is
stable in the face of market pressures; jobs, and the allocation of capital
that they embody, simply come and go. The company’s survival and expansion is the key duty, and by implication the key facet of “leadership”
is “all that matters.” Such a narrative, in this particular example, allows
Welch to both design and enforce a strategy that leads to job losses, and
to simultaneously hold that the job losses, although regretful, are not
morally attached to him. They are inevitabilities that “could not be
helped.”
This stance is emblematic of how the instrumental logic of capitalism is transmitted through the moral logic of corporate governance. It
may be that the corporate officer, having caused these actions, suffers
“agent-regret.”50 The officer wishes that these things had not come about.
This is different, however, from believing that some other course was
possible or that the corporate officer, though an agent, was an agent in a
morally relevant fashion when he or she acted. Yet this is in itself a moral narrative. It focuses on ideas of duty and office that override other
considerations. The narrative posits and explains corporate work as a
special realm and license for action. While the roles inherent in corporate
work involve action that is distinctive from “ordinary” moral life, these
roles are connected to ordinary notions of duty and desert.51
The “new employment contract”52 has seen the legitimation of corporate capitalism through job security replaced by legitimation through
job satisfaction, which is another demonstration of the corporation working as a transmission mechanism between market and society. This relationship between organization, work, economic security, and career re-

48. ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH AND THE GE WAY 112 (1999).
49. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 31.
50. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPP. VOLS. 115 (1976).
51. There is a substantial literature on “role moralities.” See JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN
COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ROLES (2001); see also MARY DOUGLAS, HOW
INSTITUTIONS THINK (1987); WOLGAST, supra note 25. For a related and interesting discussion, see
CHRISTINE SWANTON, Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics and Business Ethics, in WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE
ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS (Rebecca L. Walker & Philip J. Ivanhoe eds.,
2007).
52. DAVID THOMAS & MONICA HIGGINS, THE BOUNDARYLESS CAREER: A NEW EMPLOYMENT
PRINCIPLE FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ERA 268 (Michael B. Arthur & Denise M Rousseau eds.,
2001); Gary D. Kissler, The New Employment Contract, 33 HUM. RES. MGMT. 335 (1994).
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flects a profound shift in corporate capitalism’s moral economy, through
which questions about economic and social power distribution are
matched discourse about fairness.53 Corporate commitments to workers’
livelihoods, at least in the Anglo-American economic spheres, have been
replaced by narratives and structures referring to the individual’s responsibility—using opportunities provided by the corporate context—to develop their human capital.54 Corporations have not only incorporated
“societally legitimated rationalised elements”55 into their structures, but
have also driven the narratives that legitimate those elements. At least by
the lights of this perspective, responsibility for careers has been handed
over to individuals who are encouraged to develop their own paths
through economic life.
Reference to market forces has involved more than a simple dismissal of qualms or queries through the invocation of the market as a “black
box.” Instead, we see an emphasis placed on virtues of duty and loyalty
to the company. There is some evidence that this has been accompanied
by broader shifts in attitudes toward corporate power, which accepts the
place of market forces in economic life. Individuals may be responsive to
such narratives in devising a sense of fairness relating to corporate
layoffs.56 Given this, the corporate economy has, so far, been quite successful in concocting a moral language around markets, and in negotiating its own legitimacy, despite its dominant position over most people’s
lives and the evidence of layoffs’ damaging effects.57
These narratives, often presented as “justificatory truths,” “grow
legs”58 in an environment that takes those claims as both an explanation
for current trends and as legitimation for those who benefit from those
trends. The production of economic theory as the discovery of new truths
is also the production of legitimatizing norms. Nonetheless, it is im53. THOMPSON, supra note 2; see also STEFFEN MAU, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE
STATES (2003); SCOTT, supra note 2; Booth, supra note 16.
54. GARY STANLEY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1993); see also Jason Read, A Genealogy of
Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity, 6 FOUCAULT STUD. 25
(2009).
55. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17, at 352.
56. Gary Charness & David I. Levine, When Are Layoffs Acceptable – Evidence from a QuasiExperiment, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 381 (2000); Kevin F. Hallock, Layoffs in Large U.S. Firms
from the Perspective of Senior Managers, 25 RES. PERSONNEL & HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 137
(2006); Denise M. Rousseau & K. Aquino, Fairness and Implied Contract Obligations in Job Terminations: The Role of Remedies, Social Accounts and Procedural Justice, 6 HUM. PERFORMANCE
135 (1993).
57. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 265 (1995).
58. Laureen Snider, The Sociology of Corporate Crime, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 169,
180 (2000).
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portant to note the role that the idea of the company plays in transmitting
a moral vocabulary for market capitalism, not least because of its presence in both a series of market arenas and in “ordinary” society.59 This is
not to say that the moral vocabularies of capitalism are made by the
company as a pre-existing object; rather, they are performed and narrated
through the company. Corporate personhood, emergent through the performance of a justificatory narrative, acts to explain the wider vicissitudes of capitalism in society. It re-embeds the economy in society’s
moral landscape.
The construction of practices and institutions—and through them
the performative personhood of the firm—takes place almost solely
through the narrative form. Whereas, as Vice says, natural persons “just
live,” firms present themselves and live through the stories they make
because, ultimately, they are little more than stories—whether in terms of
founding metrics and processes of admonition and approbation, or in
terms of describing their own place in the world. The fictional person of
the firm must rely on the form and format of fiction, through the production and placing of character in the world, in order to live.60
In this part, I have set out a substantial sense of corporate personhood as a narrative-based performance that both creates and is sustained
by its own institutions and practices. Corporate personhood, by this light,
is a pattern of justification, and this pattern, through processes of “legitimation and institutionalization,” makes the firm appear as a “natural and
meaningful,”61 wholly unified agent.62 The company, cast adrift of the
capitalist, is still subject to, and seeks, efforts to define and sustain its
place in the world. As I set out in the next section, narratives of corporate
responsibility go to the heart of patterns of justification.
VI. THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A SCHOOL OF
SOCIAL REFORM
The idea of the company’s moral personhood and the role of the
idea of the company as a transmission mechanism is seen to play out
with regard to the rise of corporate governance itself—of doing business
well—as a core dimension of social responsibility. As explained above,
separated from the capitalist with the separation of ownership and control, the company was no longer in a position to avail itself of a mediated
moral sense transmitted through the capitalist. So, as with Mr. Thornton
59. See KANTER, supra note 41.
60. Vice, supra note 34, at 10.
61. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 576 (1995).
62. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 22, at 31.
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in North and South, it was no longer possible to reform the corporation’s
presence in the world through individual redemption. There was no access to corporate reform through “schools of social reform” as individuals encountered. Cast adrift, the company has sought narrative ties
through which it could be explained and personified. These ties, and the
institutions from which they arise, tend to situate themselves in wider
“myths” and “understandings of social reality.”63
In this part, I present a brief discussion of the switch to sustainability and citizenship, especially drawing on the corporate reporting of two
financial institutions: Barclays Bank and HSBC. While the position of
the financial sector is interesting because the current crisis is of its own
making, Barclays is particularly interesting because of its recent invocation of citizenship narratives through its “Citizenship 2015” initiative.64
HSBC, as we see below, is interesting because its reports bear witness to
a switch from a “gift-giving” to a “sustainability” mode.
The main aim of this part is to set out a sense of sustainability as a
form of corporate personhood that reflects a particular sense of the corporate person as arising from market-driven social imperatives. Recall
that corporate personhood, here, involves the productions of narratives
that both explain and justify the corporation’s place in society, and that
also act as a transmission mechanism between market and society. It is
the “personification of industrial capitalism,” as Paddy Ireland had it,
though not as a simple cipher; it personifies capitalism and moral economy by adopting many of the key aspects of moral personhood.65
A. Gifts and Corporate Philanthropy
Although there is a long-standing history of addressing corporate
responsibility issues through ideas of citizenship,66 much of the corporation’s actions are focused on corporate giving. While “the link between
these gifts and the interests of shareholders was indirect,”67 corporate
giving, as the action driven by ideas of corporate responsibility, was usu-

63. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 17, at 347.
64. 2015 Citizenship Plan, BARCLAYS (Sept. 2012), http://reports.barclays.com/cr11/ourap
proach/2015citizenshipplan.html?cat=m.
65. Ireland, supra note 11, at 69.
66. See, e.g., CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS. CO. AFFAIRS COMM., THE WATKINSON
REPORT (1973); see also Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 BUS. SOC’Y 268
(1999) (outlining the evolving concept of corporate social responsibility).
67. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 18 (2005).
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ally performed in line with ideas of responsibility as reputation, competitiveness, and risk management.68
Alongside this, corporations allowed themselves to be recruited as
collaborators in state-led regeneration projects.69 More recently, the
United Kingdom has entered into effective partnerships with government
in nonprofit academy schools and in constructing semipublic spaces
around healthcare and entertainment. Banks have become involved in
financial-literacy educational schemes and microfinance initiatives,
which I discuss below.
While the gift-giving style of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
is effective as a form of marketing and managing image and reputation, it
has done little to integrate the company into society. Instead, it emphasizes corporate domination over people’s lives. Gifts, as Marcel Mauss
put it, are “total social phenomena” that bind giver and receiver in society. “[T]o refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality.”70 The receiver of the gift is not a simple beneficiary if the gift
cannot be reciprocated. They must return the gift through obedience and
respect for the giver’s authority: they are in the giver’s debt.71
The gift-giving style of CSR in parallel to this account rejects a
conception of the company that sees it beyond the realm of “ordinary
moral community.” It stands outside the normal flows of moral community, seeking to legitimatize itself through the provision of patronage and
gifts. Following Dinah Rajak’s formulation, it is possible to see this style
of CSR as being “characterised not by the Maussian ideal of mutual interdependence, but by deference and dependency in return for the patron’s provision.”72 We should be cognizant of the fact that the quest for
legitimation is, in itself, a sign of mutual dependency.73 Responsibility by
these lights is a strategy: it is not characterized by a will to restore ordinary values to production.
The emergence of sustainability and citizenship narratives in these
kinds of discussions around CSR is interesting here. As the Watkinson
68. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 18; Deakin, supra note 18, at 985; see
Louis W. Fry et al., Corporate Contributions, 25 ACAD. MGMT. J. 94 (1982) (reviewing literature
and grips with motivations behind giving from an American perspective); see also Archie B. Carroll
& Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, 12 INT’L J. MGMT
REV. 85 (2010); Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 105 (1994).
69. See SALLY WHEELER, CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WAY (2002).
70. MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT 13 (2d ed. 1997).
71. See DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5000 YEARS (2011).
72. DINAH RAJAK, IN GOOD COMPANY 177 (2011).
73. See Suchman, supra note 61.
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report highlighted,74 the alignment of social responsibility with corporate
governance and a more expansive community involvement is not new.
Nonetheless, the rise in corporate social reporting, and in the standalone
social report in particular, has been paralleled by the rise of sustainability
as a key norm in corporate narratives. I argue that this reflects a new,
more cohesive personification of the company as social responsibility
comes into line with market values.
The remainder of this part is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the rise of sustainability narratives in the corporate reports of Barclays and HSBC. Second, returning to the discussion of corporate personhood above, I suggest that sustainability narratives seek both to embed the company in the “ordinary” moral world. Finally, I discuss the
manner in which the emergence of sustainability narratives as core ideas
of corporate responsibility serves to transmit broad neoliberal norms by
positing corporate governance as social responsibility in itself.
B. Social-Responsibility Reports
The rise of the standalone social-responsibility report has tended to
coincide with the emergence of sustainability narratives and perhaps, just
as importantly, with governmental, nongovernmental, and quasigovernmental partnership initiatives oriented toward CSR.75 Codes of
conduct, such as the “Equator Principles”76 and the U.N. Global Compact,77 are monitored and measured both by NGOs and by consultants in
order to bring transparency to reports. To highlight their sustainability
credentials, companies may collaborate and indeed compete over the top
spot in responsibility indexes through organizations like Business in the
Community.78
74. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS. CO. AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 66.
75. See TOM FOX ET AL., WORLD BANK, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY (2002), available at
http://www.observatoritercersector.org/pdf/centre_recursos/3_4_fox_01345.pdf; SHARI NOURICK,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: PARTNERS FOR
PROGRESS (2001); Daniel Arenas et al., The Role of NGOs in CSR, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 175 (2009);
Dima Jamali & Tamar Keshishian, Uneasy Alliances, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 277 (2008); Florence
Palpacuer, Challenging Governance in Global Commodity Chains: The Case of Transnational Activist Campaigns for Better Working Conditions, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
21, at 276.
76. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013)
(governing the social and environmental impact associated with the financing of projects).
77. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Jan.
10, 2013).
78. BUSINESS IN THE COMMUNITY, http://www.bitc.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013); see also
RAJAK, supra note 72, at 29.
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The crucial switch in responsibility narratives is from the giftgiving accounts presented above and corporate governance-oriented narratives. While the switch often predates the adoption of standalone sustainability reporting, HSBC’s report points to the juxtaposition between
the two. Depending on what is included as a “gift,” up to half of its 2000
report, HSBC in the Community: Sharing Our Success,79 is devoted to
different kinds of gift-giving. These reports are focused on HSBC’s priorities: education, inculcation of business and financial skills, and environment. Interestingly, in light of the new social contract, corporate responsibility is also attached to staff giving their time to projects, presumably facilitated by the company.
Sometimes the gift-giving seems more straightforwardly philanthropic:
The Prem Dan Opportunity Centre in Mumbai (formerly Bombay) has given hope to thousands of children over the past 20 years.
HSBC is supporting the founder, Sister Felicity, and her staff who
currently teach vocational skills to more than 800 abused children in
the centre’s three purpose-built schools, as well as providing a home
for them.80

In the United Kingdom,
HSBC’s support for the Technology Colleges Trust, in particular for language colleges in underprivileged areas, continues to
grow. Our investment in language education, particularly in Portuguese and Mandarin, not only reflects our international background,
but highlights the need for greater international communication
skills in the future.81

The list continues with gifts to the Wildlife and Wetlands Trust, mentoring programs employing HSBC staff in Buffalo, New York, ecology
programs in New York City, and the like.
By the time the 2010 sustainability report came about, however, the
gift-giving mode had almost entirely disappeared. Where it remains, it is
sharply focused on environmental gifts involving staff donations of time
and almost exclusively on financial education.82 The dominant themes of
the 2010 sustainability report are on the company doing business well.
79. HSBC HOLDINGS, HSBC IN THE COMMUNITY: SHARING OUR SUCCESS (2000), available at
http://www.csr-china.net/attach.aspx?l=cn&contentid=fcb0e728-e9b6-457d-9b21-961e8e322b8c&
count=0.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 9.
82. HSBC HOLDINGS, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010 (2010), available at https://www.hsbc.
com/1/PA_esf-ca-app-content/content/assets/sustainability/110526_sustainability_report_2010.pdf.
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So, its environmental credentials are set out either through its own efficiency programs,83 or through the provision of financial facilities and
services to “climate business” and other commercial opportunities with
an environmental aspect.84 The report focuses on attracting and “valuing”
employees, treating customers well, paying taxes, and preventing financial crime. It addresses issues around the managing of environmental and
other risks in order to “sustain” the business because “environmental and
social risks can have a material impact on the financial success of our
business and that of our customers.”85 The report in general is rounded
off with an assurance report from Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, attesting to the veracity of the report.86
The journey between early and more recent reports is less stark in
the case of Barclays Bank, whose reports across the decade have positioned it firmly in the “business case” camp when it comes to CSR.87 The
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002: Making Business Sense,
focused on four dimensions: CSR in the marketplace, the workplace, the
community, and the environment.88
Roughly half the text in the 2002 report was devoted to CSR in the
marketplace and in the workplace. In the discussion of CSR in the marketplace, the report focused on support for customers and businesses in
deprived areas, including subsidizing credit to relatively high-risk businesses. The bank also pointed to its efforts to tackle financial exclusion,
including making particular kinds of cards available to customers who
might otherwise have been excluded, efforts on behalf of disabled customers, and efforts to address financial literacy problems.89
Regarding CSR in the workplace, the report focuses on a sequence
of business and internal responsibility issues such as an account of the
bank’s “building a high-performance culture . . . to help employees fulfil
their potential.”90 Specifically, the rewards and bonus schemes that encourage employees to perform, and the training programs that are required for staff to perform, reflect the bank’s belief in its “duty to pro-

83. Id. at 18. At this stage, however, HSBC had abandoned a program to become and remain
“carbon neutral” that had been running since 2006.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Jill Treanor, Barclays Publishes Three-Year Citizenship Plan, GUARDIAN BUS. BLOG (May
23, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2012/may/23/barclays-citizenship-banking.
88. BARCLAYS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2002: MAKING BUSINESS SENSE
(2002), available at http://group.barclays.com/about-barclays/citizenship/our-archive.
89. Id. at 4–6.
90. Id. at 6.
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vide the professional and personal development opportunities vital to
long-term employability and job satisfaction.”91 Combined with these
issues is an account of the bank’s engagement with trade unions through
a partnership approach and its commitment to diversity among employees, to health and safety, including vis-à-vis HIV and AIDS, and to human rights through recruitment and labor practices.
Already, we can see tensions in the business case mode coming to
the fore. While incentive schemes and health and safety practices in the
workplace are either important components of corporate management or
conventional aspects of performance management in the financial services industry, their role in social responsibility seems limited at best.
The 2002 CSR report saw Barclays’s activities “in the community”
focus on employee volunteering and on community investment, which
was “channelled into five key areas: education, people with disabilities,
social inclusion, the arts, and the environment.”92 Regarding employee
giving, corporate support mostly consisted of the donation of employee
hours to support volunteering activities. In addition, the bank gave limited support to employees’ fundraising efforts through a “pound for
pound” program. The bank also facilitated employee giving through payroll processes. In all, roughly one third of Barclays’s “in the community”
support was in the form of direct donations, with two thirds coming from
staff volunteering or giving.93
The role of CSR in the environment is deemed to involve two parallel concerns: first, the direct environmental impact of the corporate estate, travel, paper consumption, and the like; and second, indirect impacts
through the business’s functions. The Barclays report seeks to address
both kinds of impact, outlining the bank’s efforts to alleviate its direct
environmental impact through the governance of resource usages, and its
indirect impacts through adherence to the Equator Principles and through
the general mainstreaming of environmental-risk awareness in its lending
activities. Consider, for instance, the bank’s environmental-riskmanagement unit (ERMU):
[It] continued to work with the Group’s credit teams worldwide to
raise their awareness of the environmental considerations to be factored into lending decisions. Screening of commercial land offered
as loan collateral for potential contamination is a key component of
the company’s approach, and heightened awareness of this and oth91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 10.
93. It is open to argument exactly how credit for charitable efforts should be shared between a
corporation facilitating somebody’s efforts and the person making the effort himself.
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er environmental issues resulted in a 19% increase in the number of
lending proposals referred to ERMU.94

How the approach to environmental awareness shifts across the decade is
one of the issues at play in this Article.
The business case negotiates a very fine line between a position that
“doing good for society can be good for business” and one that is more
closely described as “business decisions that are socially beneficial,” but
that remain primarily as business decisions. As the report says, “[o]ur
CSR activity is founded on financial performance. Strong financial performance provides a significant contribution to CSR in itself, but in addition it provides the foundation for greater aspiration and creativity in developing the CSR agenda.”95 I do not point to this mode of articulation as
an invitation to cynicism or by way of acceptance of a Friedmanite orientation to profits.96 Rather, the degree to which social-responsibility reporting is presented as business initiative is itself quite interesting, especially as we see the character of Barclays’s reports evolve through the
2000s.
When we get to the Barclays Citizenship Report in 2010,97 the fourpart structure of the 2002 report has been left behind. In terms of substantive sections we are presented with three broad themes: “the way we
do business,” “contributing to growth,” and “supporting our communities.” Issues around giving, business management, and especially environmental responsibility are run through each section instead of being
separated out.
What is most interesting, however, is that much of the report focuses on areas that are simply core business functions. For instance, six pages on “the way we do business” are devoted to compliance with regulatory requirements concerning fraud, money laundering, data protection,
complaint-resolution governance, and customer satisfaction. Furthermore, while some of the environmental component is devoted to reporting on environmental-risk management in lending, this section also contains information on respect for human rights, respect for diversity, and
health and safety management in the workplace. Much of this is related
either to statutory requirements or simply to good business practices.

94. BARCLAYS, supra note 88, at 12.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
97. BARCLAYS, CITIZENSHIP REPORT (2010), available at http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/
files/pdfs/barcar10_citizenshipreport.pdf.
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The section on Barclays’s contribution to growth makes significant
reference to Barclays’s tax contribution and its support for the economy
through lending, money advice, and environmental program investment.
For example, attention is devoted to the leadership in carbon markets and
social investment. The report states,
Investment managers at Barclays Wealth provide clients with
opportunities to invest in specific environmental or social funds, as
well as providing ethical screening for portfolios.
Barclays also offers clients a range of themed funds, including
low carbon Venture Capital Trusts, Enterprise Investment Schemes
and Exchange Traded Funds, which focus on clean energy, and socially responsible investment funds.
We are also one of the largest managers of charity assets in the
UK with a dedicated team overseeing around £2bn in assets under
management for some of the UK’s largest charities.98

Moving on to “supporting our communities,” the report emphasizes that
it provides support for young entrepreneurs, access to finance for people
who would otherwise be excluded, and staff-giving programs.99 It also
includes a report on environmental management, such as estate management.100
C. Interpreting the Reports
For our purposes, what is most striking about Barclays’s 2010 report is that around 15% of the text is devoted to issues that can only be
seen as matters of corporate governance or of “doing business well.” It is
devoted to legal and regulatory compliance, contribution to growth
through business activities, and similar goals. Beyond that, however, the
report articulates a seemingly more traditional business case, reporting in
a tone that is far more oriented toward the bank’s business activities. Environmental-risk management, for instance, focuses as much on the production of environmental-risk-management products for sale as it does
on assessment of other investments for environmental risks. The shift is
crucial for our understanding of how social responsibility situates the
company as a moral person.
Following Mauss, we might see the gift-giving responsibility mode,
apparent in HSBC’s 2000 report, as positioning the company as being
98. Id. at 57.
99. Id. at 60.
100. Id. at 70.
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somewhat outside society, situating it as dominant and powerful. The
sustainability mode, perfected in more recent reports both from HSBC
and Barclays, sees the company formulated less as a powerful actor donating resources to favored projects and clients, and more as an ordinary
member of moral society. The imperatives produced by environmental
concerns have been incorporated in a broader narrative of corporate governance in order to put forward an idea of the company as sustainable in
the round: as a sustainable business, as an equal player in society’s environmental project, and as an entity that is responsible simply by being
itself well. The sustainability narrative, in short, has produced a ground
in which a company can articulate itself as a moral end in itself—it is its
own school of social reform.
That is, existing practices and institutions of corporate selfhood, focused on governance and employment satisfaction norms, have keyed
into conventions surrounding environmental concerns, and have seen the
company reinterpreted as negotiating and defining the meaning of sustainability in new ways. We ought not to see this as debasing the meaning of sustainability, but as reproducing corporate personhood—an attempt to produce a narrative that situates and lends coherence to the
company, naming its place in society and giving purpose to its internal
functions and work.
The metrics-based workings of sustainability narratives are themselves revealing. Whereas gift-giving, as Vogel says, cannot be linked to
the interests of shareholders with any ease, sustainability narratives present the company more completely as investor oriented while simultaneously presenting corporate governance and management as morally ordinary. Responsibility is held to simply mean running the company well,
treating staff well, obeying the law, and innovating in new markets. And
all this is amenable to the company’s metrics-generation capacities,
whether through external audit or internal control.
More than that, the rise of sustainability narratives acts as a transmission mechanism that seeks to bring corporate conduct and the hierarchies, disciplines, and licences of corporate economy as a whole to society. It seeks to reinforce the myths and conventions through which a
broadly neoliberal moral economy is established. As such, sustainability
is far more substantial than “greenwash” allegations suggest. It is not the
environmental actions arising from sustainability narratives that are most
telling—they are often adopted and abandoned in line with business imperatives. Its substance lies in the sustainable business in the round. Sustainable corporate governance itself, by this measure, is not simply the
school of social reform for the corporation. In its adherence to duties, to
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satisfaction in work, and to cohesive social relations, corporate governance is held as a school of social reform for society as a whole.
VII. CONCLUSION
The corporate economy cannot and does not persist on the basis of
force. Rather, it persists on the basis of ongoing attempts to define and
align the institutions and practices of the corporation and its markets in
terms of the broader myths and conventions of moral economy. The corporation—its personhood arising from attempts to provide it with a moral
narrative to find its place in programs of social reform—acts to transmit
the vicissitudes of economy in moral terms. Sustainability is its most cohesive program yet, bringing together the corporation’s disciplinary
mechanisms, its productive capacities, and its hierarchical structures in
one broad narrative. When we say that the corporation is the “personification of capital,” we should see it as the moral voice of capitalism—an
articulation, like it or not, of capitalism’s virtues.
That said, we should also see the company’s moral life as concerned with being the “proper object of love.”101 The moral life of the
corporation cannot be entirely cast free from questions of moral economy
and the broader moral life of society. While sustainability narratives reflect and reinforce the dominance of market norms and the role of the
corporation in organizing those norms, we should see the corporation’s
moral personhood as reflecting a desire to fit in. In this at least, perhaps
the corporation may be amenable to reform, and corporate responsibility
may reattach itself to its radical potential.

101. SMITH, supra note 28.

